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CRIMINAL LAw-lND1C'I'MBNT AND oooRMATION-VARIANCE BETWEEN Au.:sGATION AND PROOF-In a Texas prosecution for drunken driving, the complaint
and information charged that the defendant "•.• on or about the 11th day of .
April, A.D. 1948 ..• did then and there unlawfully while intoxicated and while
under the influence of intoxicating liquor, drive a motor vehicle ..• upon a public
highway within said county, to-wit: U.S. Highway :fl:108 about two miles north
of the City of S~ephenville, Texas...."1 Upon conviction, defendant appealed,
one ground being that the State had introduced evidence to the effect that he
drove his automobile on Highway :fl:108, not U.S. Highway :fl:108 as alleged.
Held, judgment reversed. The evidence was not s~cient to support conviction

1 As to the place of the offense in actions of this nature, the Texas courts require that the
prosecution need only allege that it occurred on a "public-highway." Thomas v. State, (Tex.
Cr. 1948) 210 S.W. (2d) 826; Duncan v. State, (Tex. Cr. 1948) 213 S.W. (2d) 824.
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because of fatal variance between allegation in information and proof. Tate v.
State, (Tex. Crim. App., 1949) 2~3 S.W. (2d) 634.
The early common law view on variance was that any discrepancy at all between an allegation of some material fact in an indictment or information-and
proof of that element was fatal to a conviction, while a deviation as to some
immaterial fact was of no consequence.2 Furthermore, if some legally essential
or material element was described to a degree that was unnecessary, nonetheless
the proof had to correspond exactly with. the given description, 3 whereas if the
entire averment, along with the descriptive matter, was surplusage, it did not have
to be proved. 4 While originally intended to prevent the prejudicing of an accused,
the rule required such strict conformity that it developed into a device for frustrating justice at every turn. This abuse led to its being repudiated and discarded
in favor of a more rational view. The modern approach, which has beeen established throughout the states_ by virtue of court decisions and statutes, goes to the
very basis for having any variance rule in selecting the proper test.5 The question
asked is whether the variance itself is material, rather than whether it is a variance
no matter how slight, as to a material matter, and the criterion of materiality is
whether the defendant is prejudiced in any way. 6 The considerations are that
the defendant be fully appraised of the nature of the offense with which he is
charged and that he be in no danger of a second prosecution for the same offense.7
Consequently, in the proper cases, words describing essential matters with unnecessary particularity have been held to be mere surplusage which need not
be proved. 8 Under this analysis, it cannot be said that the defendant in the
principal case was prejudiced. What possible justifiable reason is there for the
court to reject a competent approach to which it has previously subscribed and
to resort to the tarnished common law rule? 9 The principal case, along with the
2 State v. Brozich, 108 Ohio St. 559, 141 N.E. 491 (1923); Kemp v. United States, 41
App. ~.C. 539 (1914).
3 Hayes v. State, 33 Ala. App. 178, 31 S. (2d) 306 (1947); Kutler v. United States,
(C.C.A. 3d, 1935) 79 F. (2d) 440; Smith v. State, 107 Tex. Cr. 511, 298 S.W. 286 (1927).
4 Duncan v. State, supra, note l; Barbour v. State, 66 Ga. App. 498, 18 S.E. (2d) 40
(1941).
5 27 AM. JUR,, Indictments and Information §176 (1940); State v. Brozich, supra, note 2.
6 United States v. Twentieth Century Bus Operators, (C.C.A. 2d, 1939) 101 F. (2d)
700; State v. Potter, 195 Iowa 163, 191 N.W. 855 (1923).
? "The true inquiry ••• is not whether there has been a variance in proof, but whether
there has been such a variance as to 'affect the substantial rights' of the accused." Berger
v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 55 S.Ct. 629 (1935). See also, Henderson v. State, 97 Tex.
Cr. 247,260 S.W. 868 (1924).
s Mealer v. State, 64 Ga. App. 282, 13 S.E. (2d) 38 (1941); Barbour v. State, 66 Ga.
App. 498, 18 S.E. (2d) 40 (1941); McCallister v. State, 217 Ind. 65, 26 N.E. (2d) 391
(1940).
9 Within one month of the decision in the principal case, this same court held that where
the indictment charged that ib.e defendant had unlawfully and fraudulently taken a check
"on or about the 25th day" of March 1946,-proof that the check was taken at any time about
that time was admissible, although the check was dated March 26, 1946. Adams v. State,
(Tex. Cr. 1949) 225 S.W. (2d) 568. See also, Henderson v. State, supra, note 7.
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much publicized "drowning"10 and "stomping"11 decisions han;ded down by
this same court in the past few years, is but a part of a series of such opinions
which have shocked the public and which manifest an urgent need for reform.12
It is questionable whether legislative enactments, some of which have already
been proposed,13 can, alone, get at the real roots of the problem. R?ther, it would
seem that the trouble is more fundamental than such legislation presupposes, lying
basically with the attitude of some members of the bench and bar who seek
this sort of result Thus, a reform must come, and it must come from within, if
public confidence and respect for the legal profession is to be retained. 14

Daniel A. Isaacson,. S.Ed.

10 Gragg v. State, 148 Tex. Cr. 267, 186 S.W. (2d) 243 (1945). The defendant was
accused of drowning his wife and child. The indictment charged that the defendant did ''kill
Flora Gragg, by then and there drowning the said Flora Gragg.•.." The defendant objected
to the sufficiency of the allegation because it did not allege whether the deceased was drowned
in "water, coffee, tea or what." On appeal after conviction, the Court of Criminal Appeals
upheld this contention.
11 Northern v. State, 150 Tex. Cr. 511, 203 S.W. (2d) 206 (1947). This case involved
a murder prosecution in which the indictment charged that the defendant did "kill Fannie
McHenry by then and there kicking and stomping the said Fannie McHenry••••" When
the sufficiency of the indictment was raised on appeal after conviction, the Court of Criminal
Appeals reversed the case on the ground that the indictment did not state that the "kicking
and stomping" were done "with the feet."
12 Potts, "Texas Bar Seeks Improvement in Criminal Procedure," 31 J. 1).:M. Jun. Soc.
145 (1947-8).
13 Annual Report of the Texas State Bar Committee on Criminal Law and Procedure,
11 TEX. B.J. 306 (1948).
14 Seventy-five criminal lawyers in Dallas County have sensed this need and have formed
the Dallas County Criminal Bar Association to combat "unjust criticism of their profession."
Their objectives include (1) support of proper enforcement and administration of criminal
law; (2) to propose more just and proper criminal laws; (3) to publicize and stress the necessary place of the criminal lawyer in society; ( 4) to strive for a high code of ethics among the
profession; (5) to educate the public and themselves on the duties of the criminal lawyer.
12 TEX. B.J. 498 (1949).

